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ENVIRONMENTAL BURDENS AND
DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE
Gerald Torrest
I. Introduction*
In 1975, the United States Commission on Civil Rights chided
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA")
t © 1994 by Gerald Torres. Counsel to the Attorney General, on leave from the
University of Texas Law School. I would like to thank the hard work and dedication
of Catherine Sheafor and John Lee, lawyers in the Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division of the Department of Justice. This Article could not have been writ-
ten without their assistance. The views expressed in this Article are mine alone and
do not represent the positions of the Department of Justice. Resources of the Depart-
ment were not used in the production of this Article.
* This Article argues for a reform of the regulatory process we apply to
scrutinize an increasing number of environmental justice issues. In arguing for such
reform, it is important to point out both what this Article attempts to do, and what it
does not attempt to do.
The Article is not intended to prescribe specific regulatory responses to any one
particular environmental justice case or anticipated case. The analysis recognizes that
each environmental justice claim has its own set of regulatory necessities and each
Department and agency has its own regulatory culture. In every instance in which an
environmental justice claim is raised, the particular facts of that case must be
considered within the context of applicable laws, the general federal administrative
structure, and an agency's individual regulatory culture.
On the other hand, this Article attempts to address regulatory reform from two
points of view. First, it offers a general regulatory prescription for all policy makers
who may be required to think through environmental justice issues when they arise.
Second, it provides a generic regulatory template that may guide independent
agencies in their handling of environmental justice issues as general reform of the
regulatory process proceeds.
On February 11, 1994, President Clinton issued an Executive Order, Exec. Order
12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994), promoting federal actions to address
environmental justice in minority and low income communities. The Executive Order
directs each federal agency to achieve environmental justice as part of its mission to
the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law. Agencies are required to
identify programs, policies, or activities which cause disproportionately high and
adverse human health or environmental effects. It further directs agencies to develop
strategies to address those effects.
The Executive Order is a response to many of the regulatory problems diagnosed in
the Article. By requiring each agency to examine its own internal administrative
procedures, the Executive Order respects the independent regulatory cultures which
exist throughout the federal government. By establishing a federal working group
whose jurisdiction cuts across all federal agencies, the Executive Order recognizes the
need to make certain the independent regulatory processes proceed coherently.
Like the Executive Order, this Article advocates a new way of addressing
environmental justice issues within the current regulatory regime. It encourages
participation of affected communities in policy decisions which may have adverse
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for its failure to recognize its responsibility "to ensure that condi-
tions such as the lack of fair housing laws, absence of a fair housing
agency or the existence of exclusionary zoning ordinances do not
contribute to the effective exclusion of minorities from EPA assist-
ance."1 The Commission simultaneously declared that if EPA did
not take "positive steps to insure an end to the systematic discrimi-
nation which has resulted in inadequate sewer services in many mi-
nority communities," it would be responsible for perpetuating
discrimination.2 In response, EPA claimed it was not responsible
for advocating the construction of sewer services in minority com-
munities nationwide.
Until recently, EPA continued to take a narrow view of its mis-
sion to protect public health and the environment.' Now, after in-
vestigation and criticism of the distributional inequities of
environmental policies by the legal academic community,5 other
human health or environmental effects. It also directs decision makers to consider
the fact of potential adverse environmental effects when making regulatory decisions.
Increased participation and consideration of adverse effects ought to become
hallmarks of regulatory reform in this Administration as we address the issues central
to achieving environmental justice.
1. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT-1974, 598-99 (1975).
2. Id. at 595.
3. Id. at 589 (Letter from Carol M. Thomas, Director, EPA Office of Civil Rights,
to John A. Buggs, Staff Director, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (July 8, 1975)).
4. See, e.g., id.; William K. Reilly, Environmental Equity: EPA's Position, 18 EPA
J. 18, 22 (Mar./Apr. 1992) (minorities are often the chief beneficiaries of more general
efforts to protect the environment).
5. Most legal academic investigations have come in the form of legal think pieces.
Many were published within the last year and most focus on what citizens can do to
get federal and state decisionmakers to remedy environmental racism. See, e.g., Re-
gina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority Grassroots
Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69 (1991);
Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting
of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993); Edward P.
Boyle, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental Discrimi-
nation, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 937 (1993); Kelly M. Colquette & Elizabeth A.H. Robertson, Environmental
Racism: The Causes, Consequences, and Commendations, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 153
(1991); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Ef-
fects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787 (1993); Peter L. Reich,
Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 KAN. L.
REV. 271 (1992); R. George Wright, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the Problems of
Stigmatic and Racial Injury, 23 ARIz. ST. L.J. 777 (1991); Rachel Godsil, Note, Reme-
dying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394 (1991); Naikang Tsao, Note,
Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizens' Guide to Combatting the Discrimi-
natory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 366 (1992).
19941 DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 433
academics,6 civil rights activists, and grass roots organizers,7 EPA
has recognized that it must investigate the distributional effects of
its policies and practices.' The Clinton Administration and EPA
Administrator Browner have declared their commitment to ensur-
ing that environmental benefits and burdens are distributed fairly. 9
To date, however, there has been relatively little academic dis-
cussion about how EPA and other federal agencies can achieve en-
vironmental justice.10 In addition, most legal academic literature
has focused either on simply identifying the legal issues associated
with race and environmental law or on developing a litigation strat-
egy for remedying "environmental racism."" None of the legal ac-
6. Other academics have explored the issue in similar pieces. See, e.g., ROBERT
D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
(1990); Pat Bryant, Toxics and Racial Justice, 20 Soc. POL'Y, Summer 1989, at 48; Paul
Mohai, Black Environmentalism, 71 Soc. Sci. Q. 744 (1990).
7. While academics have focused on theoretical analyses of distributional inequi-
ties and theoretical solutions to such inequities, civil rights activists and grass roots
organizers have banded together to plead their cause. Luke W. Cole, Remedies for
Environmental Racism: A View From the Field, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1991 (1992); Luke
W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Envi-
ronmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L. Q. 619 (1992); Bryant, supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., EPA Agency Announces Advisory Panel on Environmental Justice
Issues, BNA Nat'l Envtl. Daily (Nov. 10, 1993); Craig Flournoy, EPA Chief Vows West
Dallas Lead Cleanup, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 15, 1993, at 26A.
9. On Earth Day, April 21, 1993, President Clinton announced that EPA and the
Department of Justice would "begin an interagency review of federal, state, and local
regulations and enforcement that affect communities of color and low-income com-
munities with the goal of formulating an aggressive investigation of the inequalities in
exposure to environmental hazards." In addition, EPA Administrator Carol Browner
listed "environmental justice" as one of four priorities for her term at EPA. And,
Administrator Browner affirmed the Administration's commitment to environmental
justice, stating that "we must explicitly recognize the ethnic, economic, and cultural
make-up of the people we are trying to protect." On February 11, 1994, President
Clinton signed Executive Order No. 12,898, Federal Actions to Address Environmen-
tal Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations. That Order requires
all federal agencies conducting activities that substantially affect human health or the
environment to make environmental justice a priority. To that end, each federal
agency must develop an environmental justice strategy by December 11, 1994. Exec.
Order No. 12,898, 58 Fed. Reg. 63,955 (1994).
10. Although others have attempted to define environmental justice, see, e.g.,
Deeohn Ferris, A Challenge to EPA, 18 EPA J. 28 (1992); Dorceta Taylor, The Envi-
ronmental Justice Movement, 18 EPA J. 23, 24 (1992), this Article does not define the
term. Rather, it assumes that the definition continues to evolve as policymakers
struggle to develop an awareness and understanding of the potential distributional'
effects of environmental policies and practices. After all, without a full understanding
of environmental risks, the distribution of those risks and the effects of particular
policies on distribution patterns, policymakers can neither determine what is a just
distribution nor develop a strategy for achieving "justice."
11. See, e.g., Godsil, supra note 5; Tsao, supra note 5. Many scholars and activists
have used the term "environmental racism" to describe the disproportionate burden
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ademic literature has focused on the benefits of using an
administrative framework to define or develop sustainable solu-
tions to the distributional inequities of environmental laws. The
purpose of this Article is to explain the benefits of pursuing an
administrative model for change.12 Unlike other legal academic
pieces, this Article does not focus exclusively on the presence of
distributional inequities or on private litigants' judicial remedies
for distributional inequities. Rather, it accepts that distributional
inequities are present and it offers a broader, holistic, front-end
approach to the administration of environmental laws with the goal
of creating a framework which federal agencies can use to both
achieve and maintain environmental justice.
This Article is divided into three parts. First, it briefly discusses
the history of the environmental justice movement and of historical
political responses to distributional issues associated with the envi-
ronment and human health. The second part of the Article de-
scribes the problems with relying exclusively on litigation as a
mechanism for achieving environmental justice. Finally, this Arti-
cle presents the theoretical basis for pursuing administrative solu-
tions to the inequitable distribution of environmental hazards.
II. Background of Environmental Justice
In 1982, North Carolina officials decided to locate a poly-chlo-
rinated biphenyl landfill near a predominantly black community in
Warren County, North Carolina, resulting in protests similar to
those associated with the civil rights movement in the 1960s.' 3
Thereafter, Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy requested an investi-
of environmental hazards on minority communities. In order to make sense of that
term, one must have a clear idea of the highly charged and apparent meaning the
term has. See Gerald Torres, Race, Class, and Environmental Regulation, 63 UNIv.
COL. L. REV. 839 (1992). The meaning is clouded to the extent that the term gets
broadly applied to a variety of activities and outcomes. Id. Because the issues sur-
rounding environmental justice are so complex, one should be particularly careful not
to adopt a single model or single slogan to assess or criticize the deficiencies of envi-
ronmental protection policy. Id. at 847. Rather, environmental protection policy
should be approached with a sensitivity to both the everyday reality of all affected
groups and to the limitations of natural systems. Id. at 847-48; see also Paul Mohai &
Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Factors in the
Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 UNIv. COL. L. REV. 921 (1992); A. Dan
Tarlock, Environmental Protection: The Potential Misfit Between Equity and Effi-
ciency, 63 UNIV. COL. L. REV. 871 (1992). Only with this awareness can those who
construct environmental policy develop policies that promote and sustain environ-
mental justice.
12. See infra part IV.
13. See Godsil, supra note 5, at 394.
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gation by the U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO") of the so-
cioeconomic and racial composition of the communities
surrounding hazardous waste landfills in the South. 4 The 1983
GAO Study found that three of the four major landfills were lo-
cated in predominantly black communities where citizens lived dis-
proportionately below the poverty line.' 5
In 1987, motivated by the events in North Carolina and the
GAO report, the United Church of Christ ("UCC") created a
Commission for Racial Justice to conduct a nationwide study of the
distribution of hazardous waste sites to determine if waste sites
were disproportionately located in poor, minority neighborhoods.' 6
The UCC's study on the distribution of hazardous waste sites
found that race proved to be the most significant variable associ-
ated with the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities. 7
Although the UCC Report spawned widespread inquiry into the
correlation between race and environmental hazards, environmen-
tal justice really did not rise to the level of public debate until Janu-
ary 1990, when academicians and civil rights leaders convened the
Michigan Conference on Race and Incidence of Environmental
Hazards.
Since 1990, academicians, civil rights leaders and environmental
groups have worked with grass roots activists to identify inequities
in the distribution of environmental hazards and have found that
distributional inequities exist in many areas, not just in hazardous
waste facility siting. For example, minority and lower income chil-
dren retain the highest risk of elevated blood lead levels.' 8 Some
studies show that minorities disproportionately suffer from occupa-
tional health risks such as exposure to pesticides, solvents, and
metals. 19 In the contiguous United States, greater percentages of
African Americans and Hispanics live in areas of reduced air qual-
ity than do whites.20 Native Americans consume greater amounts
14. U.S. General Accounting Office, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS
AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING
COMMUNITIES (1983) at 2 [hereinafter GAO STUDY].
15. Id.
16. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, Toxic
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter UCC REPORT].
17. Id.
18. Joel Schwarts & Ronnie Levin, Lead: Example of the Job Ahead, 18 EPA J. 42,
44 (1992).
19. Ivette Perfecto & Baldemar Valasquez, Farm Workers: Among the Least Pro-
tected, 18 EPA J. 13, 14 (1992).
20. D.R. Wernette & L.A. Nieves, Breathing Polluted Air, 18 EPA J. 16, 16-17
(1992).
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of Great Lakes fish than the general population and may be at
greater risk for dietary exposure to toxic chemicals. 21 Finally, pol-
lution control often results in displaced job opportunities for mi-
nority and low-income workers.22
Traditional civil rights groups and environmental organizations
have joined grass roots organizations and are beginning to search
for ways to reduce these disproportionate effects on minorities.23
Solutions, however, will not come overnight because policymakers
and advocacy groups are still defining the issues. That process
must not be taken lightly as the framing of the "problem" necessar-
ily affects the framing of solutions, and those solutions can take a
variety of forms.
III. Seeking Environmental Justice in the Courtroom
Throughout this century, people of color, when faced with inci-
dents of racial oppression and discrimination, have successfully in-
voked the judiciary to execute the guarantees of our Constitution.24
Not surprisingly, minority communities turned to the courts in or-
der to seek redress for the disproportionate environmental burdens
placed upon them. However, litigation has produced only limited
success in combatting racially discriminatory inequities in the envi-
ronmental arena.
This section argues that litigation, while at times useful and even
necessary, may not be the most productive forum for people of
color to address the environmental hazards imposed upon their
communities. The doctrinal constraints of the equal protection
clause, statutory limitations of substantive environmental laws and
regulations, as well as practical and political considerations, all
21. Patrick C. West, Health Concerns for Fish-Eating Tribes?, 18 EPA J. 15 (1992).
Significantly, Exec. Order 12,898 requires additional investigation of fish consumption
patterns.
22. When jobs are displaced because of pollution control costs, it is more likely
that those with less seniority lose their jobs. Lazarus, supra note 5, at 795, 799-800.
Since minorities typically comprise a disproportionately large percentage of employ-
ees with lower seniority, minorities are often the ones that are displaced.
23. For example, many civil rights leaders and environmental justice organizers
participated last summer and fall in the National Advisory Committee Environmental
Policy and Technology.
24. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (voting); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employment); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1955) (education).
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counsel that the battle for environmental justice may be better
fought in the political, rather than judicial, forum.25
Presently, environmental justice causes of action26 fall into two
main categories: (1) antidiscrimination causes of action, and (2) en-
vironmental statutory causes of action. Antidiscrimination causes
of action in the environmental context have relied primarily upon
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments .2  For such claims, the distributional inequities of environ-
mental risks and hazards serve as the substantive basis of the
grievance. Yet, the straight civil rights or antidiscrimination ap-
proach has not had great success.28 The failures owe less to the
merits of the claims than to the levels of proof required to prevail
in cases of alleged intentional discrimination.
Environmental statutory causes of action, on the other hand, os-
tensibly seek to enforce the statutory and regulatory obligations
imposed upon government agencies and private actors by various
federal and state environmental laws. In these cases, while distri-
butional inequities may be the underlying motivation of such
claims, they are not directly relevant to the subject matter of the
claim. As a result, these claims have had more success. However,
the scope of these types of claims may be limited. A discussion of
each category follows. 29
A. The Antidiscrimination Cases: Equal Protection and the
Search for Purposeful Discrimination
If the disparate impact test developed in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.30 heralded the heyday of the antidiscrimination era in the
courtroom, 31 Washington v. Davis32 quickly signalled its demise. In
25. I do not mean to suggest that litigation should be avoided altogether. Rather, I
believe that minority communities-and their advocates-must recognize the limits
and constraints of the judicial process if they are to utilize their resources most
effectively.
26. By "environmental justice causes of action" I mean those legal claims that
seek to redress the greater environmental burdens and risks that minority communi-
ties are forced to bear.
27. See infra nn. 30-41 for a discussion of environmental justice and the Equal
Protection clause. To date, few cases have raised state constitutional claims. For a
discussion of such claims see Tsao, supra note 5, at 394-405.
28. See infra part II.A.
29. Certainly, these are not the only avenues to obtain judicial relief. For further
discussions of state law claims, see, Tsao, supra note 5; Reich, supra note 5, at 300-13.
30. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (diploma as condition of employment unconstitutional).
31. For such a view of Griggs, see Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimi-
nation Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doc-
trine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1093-99 (1978).
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Davis, plaintiffs challenged an admission test which was part of an
application to enroll in a police training program and purported to
measure an applicant's verbal ability, vocabulary, and reading com-
prehension.33 Four times as many black applicants failed the test as
white applicants.34 Plaintiffs sued, contending that the test violated
the Equal Protection Clause.35
Denying plaintiffs' appeal, the Supreme Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause requires a showing of a racially discrimi-
natory intent or purpose in order to establish a violation.36 "Dis-
proportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution," wrote the Court.37 In support, the Court reasoned
that a different rule would possibly invalidate "a whole range of
tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that
may be more beneficial to the poor and to the average black than
to the more affluent white. 38
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment Corporation39 demonstrates how the Court has applied its
32. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
33. Id. at 234-35.
34. Id. at 237.
35. Id.
36. In so doing, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between employment dis-
crimination suits brought under Title VII and those filed under the Equal Protection
Clause:
We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims
of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable
under Title VII, and we decline to do so today.
Id. at 239.
37. Id. at 242. While the Court did not specify to what extent evidence of racially
disparate impact is relevant to the inquiry, it did cite Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886), as an instance where such evidence was sufficient to establish that a stat-
ute "otherwise neutral on its face" violated the Equal Protection Clause. 426 U.S. at
241. Interestingly, Justice Stevens did not consider this of much use since, in Yick Wo,
the disproportion was so dramatic that "it really does not matter whether the standard
is phrased in terms of purpose or effect." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 254 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring).
38. 426 U.S. at 248 (citation omitted). One commentator caustically noted that
such a "parade of horribles" argument "would be embarrassing in a first-year law
class." Freeman, supra note 30, at 1115. The intent requirement espoused in Wash-
ington v. Davis immediately provoked much academic debate. See, e.g., Derek A.
Bell, Foreword: Equal Employment and the Continuing Need for Self-Help, 8 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 681 (1977); Freeman, supra note 30; Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977). For an
interesting sociological discussion of Washington v. Davis, see Charles R. Lawrence,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REv. 317, 369-76 (1987).
39. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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holding in Washington v. Davis to government decisions. Recog-
nizing that "[r]arely can it be said that a legislature or administra-
tive body operating under a broad mandate made a decision
motivated by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose
was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one,"40 the Court outlined several
factors to consider when searching for discriminatory intent: (1)
the impact of the official action; (2) the historical background of
the decision; (3) the specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision; (4) any departures from the normal proce-
dural or substantive sequence of the decision-making process; and
(5) the legislative or administrative history of the challenged ac-
tion.4 Then, in a closing footnote, the Court observed that, even if
a racially motivated purpose were established, the government had
the opportunity to show that "the same decision would have re-
sulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered."'42
Thus, not only did the plaintiffs have to show that the decision was
motivated by intentional discrimination, but that the discrimination
was prejudicial.
It is clear that the burden of proving racially discriminatory in-
tent is an extremely difficult hurdle to overcome. This is particu-
larly evident in the context of environmental discrimination cases.
To date, four reported cases 43 have relied upon the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to challenge discriminatory sitings of solid waste land-
fills by municipal agencies."4 In all four cases, courts found that
there was insufficient evidence of racially discriminatory intent.
40. Id. at 265 (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 266-68.
42. Id. at 270-71 n. 21 (citing Mt. Healthy City Board of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977)).
43. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd, 977 F.2d 573
(4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Plan-
ning & Zoning Commission, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga.), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th
Cir. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.
Tex. 1979), affd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). For an example of an
administrative case, see In re Genesee Power Station Ltd. Partnership, PDS Appeals
Nos. 93-1 to 93-7 (Envtl. Appeals Board, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency Sept. 8,
1993).
This Article limits its discussion to federal equal protection doctrine. An antidis-
crimination suit can also be brought under state equal protection provisions and equal
rights statutes. However, at the present time, no such cases have been reported. For
a discussion of potential state causes of action, see supra notes 27-28.
44. While the environmental justice movement began with investigations of haz-
ardous waste facility siting patterns, and the equal protection cases discussed herein
are siting challenges, there are other environmental burdens that have not yet been
challenged in court. Some of these burdens are described above. See supra notes 19-
23 and accompanying text.
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Two of these cases, in particular, underscore the difficulty of prov-
ing intentional racial animus-Bean v. Southwestern Waste Man-
agement Corp.45 and R.LS.E., Inc. v. Kay.46
In Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp. , 7 the plain-
tiffs contested a permit granted by the Texas Department of Health
("TDH") to Southwestern Waste Management to operate a solid
waste facility. Plaintiffs pointed out that a similar permit for the
identical location previously had been denied,48 the facility was to
be built in an area 49 where 70% of the population were persons of
color.5 ° The site was only 1700 feet from a predominately black
high school,51 and was adjacent to a predominately black
neighborhood.52
Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, s3 plaintiffs sought a preliminary
injunction on the grounds that (1) TDH's approval of the permit
was indicative of a discriminatory pattern and practice of locating
solid waste facilities in minority areas,54 and (2) TDH's approval,
"in the context of the historical placement of solid waste sites
and the events surrounding the application, constituted
discrimination. 55
Relying upon Washington v. Davis56 and Arlington Heights,5 7 the
court held that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the permit
45. 482 F. Supp. 673.
46. 768 F. Supp. 1144; see Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Classification in Environ-
mental Equity: How We Manage Is What We Measure, 21 FORD. URB. L. J. 633, 660-65
(1993).
47. 482 F. Supp. at 673.
48. Id. at 679.
49. See Rodriguez v. Barcelo, 358 F. Supp. 43, 45 (D.P.R. 1973).
50. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 678.
51. Id. at 679.
52. Id. at 680.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
54. Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677, affd
without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
55. Id. at 678.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
440
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issuance was motivated by racial animus. 5 8 Notably, the court re-
fused to impute the past actions of the Texas Department of Water
Resources ("TDWR"), a sister state agency, to TDH when analyz-
ing the existence of past discrimination. 9 Moreover, finding that
the presence of two sites was statistically insignificant, the court
rejected plaintiffs' claim that there was a history of discriminatory
siting.6° Finally, even though there was evidence that 15% of
Houston's solid waste sites were located in an area containing only
7% of the population and that 70%, of those residing in the area
were persons of color, the court found no evidence of disparate
impact.61 While conceding that the permit decision was "illogical"
and "unfortunate and insensitive," the court concluded there was
not sufficient evidence to prove racially motivated intent.62
In R.LS.E, Inc. v. Kay,63 the King and Queen County Board of
Supervisors authorized the development of a solid waste disposal
facility. 64 Although the population of the County was 50% black
and 50% white, the population within a half-mile radius of the pro-
posed site was 64% black and 36% white.65 Moreover, three other
landfills had been approved by the County and were located in ar-
eas with large minority populations.66 Furthermore, in the one in-
stance where the County had opposed the operation of a landfill,
the surrounding community was predominately white.67
58. The court noted, "[T]he plaintiffs must show not just that the decision to grant
the permit is objectionable or even wrong, but that it is attributable to an intent to
discriminate on the basis of race." Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677-80.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 680. The court's deference to the County is striking:
If this Court were TDH, it might very well have denied this permit. It simply
does not make sense to put a solid waste site so close to a high school, partic-
ularly one with no air conditioning. Nor does it make sense to put the land
site so close to a residential neighborhood. But I am not TDH and for all I
know, TDH may regularly approve of solid waste sites located near schools
and residential areas, as illogical as that may seem.
Id. at 679-80 (emphasis added).
63. 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).
64. Id. at 1146.
65. Id. at 1148.
66. The first, Mascot landfill, was located in an area where the population within a
one-mile radius of the site was 100% black. In 1971, Dahlgren landfill was con-
structed in an area that was 90% to 95% black. Lastly, in 1977, the Owenton landfill
was placed in an area where 100% of the residents within a half-mile radius of the site
were black.
67. R.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. at 1149.
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Given these facts, the R.I.S.E. court acknowledged that the pro-
posed facility would disproportionately impact people of color.68
Moreover, the court agreed that the County had historically lo-
cated landfills in predominantly minority communities. 69 The court
even recognized the possibility that the Board may "have been
more concerned about the economic and legal plight of the County
as a whole than the sentiments of residents who opposed the place-
ment of the landfill in their neighborhood. '70 Nevertheless, the
court held that the plaintiffs had fallen short of their burden to
prove intentional discrimination.7'
As Bean and R.LS.E. illustrate, the burden to establish racially
discriminatory purpose or intent, as a legal matter, is tremendous,
particularly when the decisions at issue are governmental decisions,
as they often are in the environmental context. 72  In fact, more
often than not, environmental decisions can be-and often are-
justified upon a host of "facially neutral" factors73 such as the eco-
nomic conditions of a particular neighborhood or the environmen-
tal conditions of a specific locale.74  Nevertheless, the district
courts' reluctance to find discriminatory intent can be distinguished
from the apparent willingness of other courts to find purposeful
discrimination in cases challenging the disparate allocation of mu-
nicipal services.75
For instance, in Dowell v. City of Apopka,7 6 black residents of
Apopka alleged that the City had violated the Equal Protection
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1149.
70. Id. at 1150.
71. Id.
72. As the court noted in Arlington Heights, to divine a particular legislative or
administrative intent underlying an administrative action or decision is itself a formi-
dable task. 429 U.S. at 564-66.
73. Indeed, in this day and age, few would be so obtuse as to admit, on the record,
that he or she made a, particular decision based upon purely racial considerations.
There are few "smoking guns" when it comes to racial discrimination.
74. See, e.g., R.I.S.E. at 1150 (noting that "the Board appears to have balanced the
economic, environmental, and cultural needs"). This is not to say that all such justifi-
cations are inherently suspect. However, attempts to call methods of discrimination
and oppression by other names are not uncommon throughout the history of this
nation. Therefore, the courts should look upon such "neutral" justification with a
critical eye to insure that they are not simply clever pretexts.
75. See, e.g., Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Am-
mons v. Dade City, 594 F. Supp. 1274 (M.D. Fla. 1984), affd, 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir.
1986); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 1375, 1383 (M.D. Fla. 1981), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 689 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983).
76. 511 F. Supp. 1375, 1377 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
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Clause and other statutes77 by providing inferior municipal services
to the black community. The court had no trouble finding inten-
tional discrimination in this case. First, the court concluded that
the large disparity between street paving, storm water drainage fa-
cilities and water distribution in minority and nonminority commu-
nities gave rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.78
Additionally, the court found that requests for improvement of
services from white residents were often answered, while requests
from black residents were not.79 Finally, the court found that City
officials only needed to visit the black neighborhoods to know that
their actions would have a discriminatory impact.80 Based upon
these findings, the court ruled that the City had intentionally dis-
criminated against the black residents of Apopka in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.81
Likewise, in Baker v. City of Kissimmee,s2 the court held that the
City had purposefully discriminated against its black residents in
the provision of municipal services. Interestingly, in applying the
factors enumerated in Arlington Heights, the Baker court did not
limit its analysis of the legislative and administrative history of the
decision to particular decisions of a specific agency. 3 Rather, the
court engaged in a much broader analysis. Among the factors it
found probative of racial animus were the exclusion of black resi-
dents from a 1935 democratic primary, the history of de jure racial
segregation, prior exclusionary zoning, previous prohibitions of
black occupants from municipal property, the underemployment of
blacks within city government and "the present status of black citi-
zens at the lowest end of the socioeconomic scale resulting in their
effective exclusion from the political process."'
Although it is curious that the outcomes in the above municipal
services cases are so different from those in cases challenging solid
77. Plaintiffs also filed claims pursuant to the State and Local Assistance Act of
1972, 31 U.S.C. § 1242, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1988). Dowdell, 511 F. Supp. at 1377. For a discussion of Title VI in addressing envi-
ronmental inequity issues, see infra note 90.
78. The court observed that the City had historically directed its resources to the
predominately white neighborhoods and that blacks were under-represented in major
political and administrative positions within the city government.
79. Dowdell, 511 F. Supp. at 1383.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
83. But see East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Plan-
ning & Zoning Commission, 706 F. Supp. 880, 885 (M.D. Ga. 1989); Bean, 482 F.
Supp. at 676.
84. Baker, 645 F. Supp. at 579, 588.
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waste facilities, there are some distinctions which may explain the
results.85 First, in cases involving environmental actions-such as
siting determinations-problems of statistical analysis are particu-
larly acute. Furthermore, the low numbers of solid waste facilities
make historical analysis difficult. Finally, there is disagreement as
to the precise pool of persons affected by a particular facility or
regulation.86 These factors prohibit plaintiffs in waste facilities
cases from presenting as compelling a statistical disparity as those
in municipal services cases.87
Another distinction may be that, in municipal service cases,
courts are asked to provide an available benefit to the aggrieved
community. The cost is usually limited to specific fiscal liability-a
court merely reorders spending priorities. In contrast, in cases
challenging waste facilities, courts must allocate benefits and bur-
dens within a zero-sum game. Unlike the municipal services cases
where the allocational norm approaches equality, the allocational
norm in siting decisions always creates winners and losers. As one
commentator observed, "where the question is how environmental
risks are to be distributed or redistributed, a court is likely to per-
ceive the necessary tradeoffs. In short, the risks must go
somewhere. '88
Finally, the difference in results may also lie in the courts' per-
ception of the benefits and burdens implicated in each case. That is
to say, the consequences of inadequate municipal services-poor
roads, debris, or poor sanitation-are readily apparent, as are the
benefits of additional services-paved roads, clean neighborhoods,
good water quality. Less apparent are the benefits and burdens-
social, economic, health or psychological effects-associated with
85. For a thorough discussion of this, see Godsil, supra note 5, at 416-20; Lazarus,
supra note 5, at 833-34; Tsao, supra note 5, at 412-14.
86. See Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 678
(S.D. Tex. 1979), affid without opinion, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs argu-
ing that the court should consider the racial composition of a target area; the court
decided to consider the racial composition of a census tract).
87. See Godsil, supra note 5, at 418.
88. Lazarus, supra note 5, at 833-34. Lazarus continues:
Under these circumstances, courts seem far less willing to invoke the equal
protection clause to dictate to local government how harms such as environ-
mental risks must be redistributed in a community, perhaps because the re-
distribution would so directly implicate the quality of the environment
enjoyed by those in the community wielding great political and economic
influence.
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varying levels of exposure to environmental hazards.8 9 Whatever
the reason, in the end, courts have been more reluctant to find pur-
poseful discrimination where plaintiffs have raised environmental
justice claims as opposed to municipal services claims.
Because a plaintiff must establish racially discriminatory intent
or purpose, equal protection claims can redress only the most egre-
gious cases. Thus, such a showing is a Herculean task indeed. Fur-
thermore, such claims decontextualize the governmental action
that is challenged. They tend to address each instance in isolation,
separate and apart from the racial oppression and discrimination
experienced by people of color throughout our nation's history.90
They obfuscate the fact that present day institutions and their ac-
tions, even in the absence of intentional racial animus, can still op-
erate to perpetuate the "badges and incidents" of racial injustice91
and, in so doing, can lead to racially inequitable results.92
Just as antidiscrimination laws have not yet fully extricated our
society from the manifestations of racial discrimination, neither can
they wholly deliver us from the environmental dilemmas that over-
burden people of color.93 Therefore, if our goal is the alleviation of
the disparate environmental burdens faced by people of color, then
the Equal Protection Clause and existing antidiscrimination laws
can render only partial victories.94
89. Perhaps it is this difference that underlies the courts' observation in municipal
services cases that "[a] brief visit to the black community makes obvious the need for
street paving and storm water drainage control." Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 511 F.
Supp. 1375, 1383 (M.D. Fla. 1991), rev'd in part on other grounds, 689 F.2d 1181 (11th
Cir. 1983); see also Godsil, supra note 5, at 419-20.
90. Such claims, in their search for fault and causation, perpetuate what Freeman
terms the "perpetrator perspective." See Freeman, supra note 30, at 1052-1057.
91. This oft-quoted phrase first appears in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20
(1883) (discussing Congress's power under the Thirteenth Amendment to abolish all
badges and incidents of slavery). While racial injustice in this nation's history was
most dramatically manifested in the de jure slavery of blacks, other racial groups have
also encountered systemic discrimination. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1986) (Chinese laundry owner); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(Japanese American ordered to leave his residence).
92. See generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (discussing
society's failure to achieve equality); Lawrence, supra note 36, at 328-55 (discussing
the irrationality of racism).
93. See Luke W. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View from the
Field, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1991, 1995-97 (1992) (citing grass roots activism as the real
answer to environmental racism).
94. Another possible avenue of redress that has yet to be fully explored is Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). For a discussion of the
advantages and limitations of Title VI in the context of environmental justice, see
Lazarus, supra note 5, at 834-42. For a general discussion of Title VI and its legislative
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B. Environmental Law Claims
In addition to antidiscrimination laws, minority communities
have looked to federal and state environmental laws and regula-
tions to challenge discriminatory environmental actions.95 For ex-
ample, in El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of
Kings9 6 the residents of Kettleman City, a small residential commu-
nity in San Joaquin Valley, California, challenged a decision of the
Kings County Board of Supervisors to grant a conditional permit
for the construction and operation of a hazardous waste incinerator
in Kettleman City.97 The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the envi-
ronmental impact report prepared by the County failed to comply
with the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA").98
The court agreed, finding that the environmental impact state-
ment's analysis of air-quality impacts, agricultural impacts, and
available alternative sites was flawed. 99 More significantly, how-
ever, the court held that the County's failure to provide Spanish
translations of the environmental impact statement, public notices,
and public meeting testimony to a community, where nearly forty
percent of the residents spoke and read only Spanish, violated the
public participation requirements of the CEQA. 1'
Houston v. City of Cocoa' is another instance where environ-
mental statutes were used successfully to challenge environmental
decisions that threatened to impose disproportionate burdens upon
communities of color. In City of Cocoa, the plaintiffs challenged a
municipal revitalization plan that proposed the redevelopment of a
historic black neighborhood into large office complexes and luxury
history, see Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model
for Defining "Discrimination", 70 GEO. L.J. 1 (1981).
95. See, e.g., El Pueblo Para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, [1991] 22
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1991); Houston v.
City of Cocoa, No. 89-92-CIV-ORL-29 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1989). See generally Tsao,
supra note 5 (discussing state and federal legal remedies to environmental justice
claims).
96. 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357.
97. Ninety-five percent of the residents of Kettleman City were Latino. Seventy
percent of the residents spoke Spanish at home. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as
the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19
ENVTL. L.Q. 619, 674-79 (1992). Mr. Cole was the attorney for the plaintiffs in this
case and offers an intriguing personal account of its developments.
98. El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,357-58.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 20,358.
101. No. 89-82-CIV-ORL-19 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1989); see also Karl S. Coplan,
Protecting Minority Communities With Environmental, Civil Rights Claims, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 20, 1991, at 1 (discussing Houston v. City of Cocoa).
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residential buildings. 10 2 A portion of the design and construction
was to be funded by a Community Development Block Grant,
which was administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD). °3
The eight named plaintiffs, who sued on behalf of themselves
and a class of black residents, alleged that the City had violated the
National Environmental Policy Act' 4 (NEPA) by not considering
the potential impact of the proposed development on their neigh-
borhood. 0 5 The City filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia,
that NEPA applied only to federal agencies and that the obliga-
tions under NEPA were limited to the natural environment as dis-
tinct from urban neighborhoods.'0 6
The court denied the City's motion, holding that HUD had dele-
gated its obligations under NEPA to the City. 0 7 Moreover, the
court ruled that NEPA extended to urban, as well as natural, envi-
ronments.10 8 This ruling formed the catalyst for a negotiated settle-
ment, which guaranteed a cooperative effort between the City and
the black community to balance the economic needs of the city
with the community's desire to maintain historical homes. The set-
tlement also provided incentives for the development of low-in-
come housing within the new area.10 9
While El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio and City of Cocoa
successfully challenged the governmental action in question, Di-
oxin/Organochlorine Center v. EPA,1 0 may illustrate several limits
of relying upon existing environmental regulations to address con-
cerns of environmental inequities. In Dioxin/Organochlorine
Center, two environmental groups challenged EPA's establishment
of a Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL")"'1 for the release of
102. City of Cocoa, No. 89-82-CIV-ORL-19, slip op. at 3.
103. Id. at 2-3, 8-9.
104. See Coplan, supra note 101, at 2.
105. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of Title VII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
106. City of Cocoa, No. 89-82-CIV-ORL-19, slip op. at 13-15.
107. Id. at 13.
108. Id. at 14.
109. See Coplan, supra note 101, at 5.
110. No. C93-33 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 1993).
111. Section 303 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1988), requires each
state to adopt water quality standards applicable to its intrastate and interstate waters.
See id. § 1313(a)-(c). EPA reviews standards adopted by the states to ensure their
consistency with the requirements of the Act. Id. § 1313(c)(3)-(4). In order to meet
these water quality standards, EPA and the states were required to impose, by 1977,
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2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenezo-p-dioxin ("dioxin")" 2 in the Columbia
River basin. Plaintiffs argued, in part, that EPA incorrectly em-
ployed a 0.013 ppq water standard for dioxin when calculating the
TMDL. 13
In arriving at this water standard, EPA estimated that the con-
sumption rates by the affected community of maximum residue
fish" 4 would be equal to the national average total consumption
rate for all freshwater and estuarine fish-6.5 grams per day.
Plaintiffs pointed out, however, that even by EPA's own esti-
mates, Native Americans, Asian Americans, and low-income indi-
viduals residing along the Columbia River consume an average of
between 100 and 150 grams of fish flesh per day over the course of
a year." 5 "As a result, the human cancer risks facing these
groups-and by implication the threats of reproductive and devel-
opmental damage-are several orders of magnitude greater than
among groups that consume less."' "16
The court disagreed and upheld EPA's TMDL. Deferring to
EPA's technical determinations, it concluded that EPA had reason-
ably estimated that the actual consumption of dioxin, even by those
who consumed 150 grams of fish a day, would be less than the
amount allowed by the water quality standard since not all of the
fish in the Columbia River carried the maximum level of dioxin." 7
necessary effluent limitations. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(C). Where, however, these effluent
limitations were not sufficient to bring the water bodies in compliance with the water
quality standards, the Act also established a mechanism for determination of Total
Maximum Daily Loads. Pursuant to this program, states are required to identify pol-
luted water bodies, id. § 1311(b)(1)(A)-(B), and to develop TMDLs for pollutants on
a priority basis for each identified water body. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(A), (C). In short, a
TMDL represents the maximum amount of pollutant that can be introduced into a
receiving water body without violating water quality standards, taking into account
seasonal variations and a margin of safety. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
112. Dioxin or "TCDD" is an unusually toxic compound with acute, subacute, and
chronic effects in animals and humans; it displays an unusually high degree of repro-
ductive toxicity and is mutagenic and carcinogenic. Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr., No.
C93-33D, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 1993).
113. See id. at 13.
114. "Maximum residue fish" was defined as pollutant-bearing fish that contained
the maximum level of dioxin in ambient water and the maximum dioxin bioconcentra-
tion factor. United States' Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for
Summary Judgment and In Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dioxin/
Organochlorine Ctr. v. Rasmussen, Civ. No. C93-0033, at 57-58 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10,
1993) (on file with author).
115. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Rasmussen, Civ. No. C93-0033, at 16-17 (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 10, 1993) (citations omitted) (on file with author).
116. Id. at 17.
117. Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr., No. C93-33D, slip op. at 16.
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Furthermore, in a footnote, the court remarked that even assuming
that an individual consumed 150 grams of maximum residue fish,
that person would face a twenty-three in a million risk level for
cancer, a level that was deemed acceptable by the courts. 118
Interestingly, EPA's victory in this case can be attributed more
to its conservative risk analysis than to its sensitivity to the varying
dietary habits of affected minority communities. Indeed, while the
TMDL may not pose a threat to the health of minority communi-
ties in proximity to the Columbia River, these minority communi-
ties suffer secondary effects of the TMDL. Even under EPA's
analysis, members of these communities, on average, consume
more fish and, therefore, face a greater risk of cancer than those of
nonminority communities. The fact is that in ignoring the differ-
ences of culture, class, and race, the dioxin TMDL for the Colum-
bia River resulted in a disproportionate distribution of risk of
cancer for minority residents along the Columbia River.
While El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio and City of Cocoa
demonstrate that state and federal environmental statutes may
provide novel avenues for addressing issues of environmental jus-
tice, they, along with DioxinlOrganochlorine Center, show that the
effectiveness of this approach is limited. First, federal statutes such
as NEPA apply principally to federal agencies." 9 Additionally,
both state and federal environmental statutes and regulations are
highly technical and complex and may intimidate even experienced
litigators. Furthermore, the victories in such cases are often proce-
dural and fact-specific. Presumably, had the County in El Pueblo
para el Aire y Agua Limpio analyzed the environmental data cor-
rectly and provided Spanish translations, the court would have up-
held the permit notwithstanding the fact that Kettleman City was a
predominately Latino community. 20 Finally, courts traditionally
have granted substantial deference to agency determinations,
which is an unsatisfying response when such determinations do not
benefit from the participation of minority plaintiffs.
118. Id. n.5.
119. See Reich, supra note 5, at 297 (discussing limitations of NEPA in addressing
instances of environmental inequities); Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About
NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973) (generally critiquing NEPA).
120. Perhaps if the County had received the benefit of community input, it still
would not have made a different choice. Indeed, the significance of this decision is its
recognition that communities of color must be given the opportunity to participate in
governmental decision-making in a meaningful fashion. That is, their concerns should
carry as much weight as those of non-minorities.
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Furthermore, few statutes-state or federal-require agency of-
ficials to consider the racial or distributional effects of an environ-
mental decision or action.12 1 Therefore, as aptly demonstrated by
Dioxin/Organochlorine Center, a claim that relies upon a tradi-
tional environmental statute often does not necessarily affect the
underlying decisionmaking process through which environmental
benefits and burdens are distributed.
C. The Limitations of Litigation
When discussing racial discrimination, it is instructive to view the
world through the eyes of those who are oppressed. 22 When
viewed in this context, litigation as a whole may be seen to con-
struct more barriers to community involvement and empowerment
than it raises. To poor people and people of color, the environ-
mental problems they face in their communities are primarily not
legal ones, but political and economic ones. 23 The harms they ex-
perience are rooted more in the lack of political force and eco-
nomic resources than a dearth of legal enforcement. After all, it is
lack of informed participation and legal or regulatory experience
that leaves many communities helpless against an agency's decision
to locate a solid waste facility in their community. It is lack of
clout, monetary and political, that often leads municipal govern-
ments to ignore requests by the poor and people of color for in-
creased police protection, cleaner streets, and better schools.
Therefore, while lawsuits can alleviate the most egregious instances
121. Given EPA's limited reading of Title VI, even that statute falls short. See Laz-
arus, supra note 5, at 836-38. For examples of attempts by state and local govern-
ments to address this issue, see Tsao, supra note 5, at 368-404.
122. Such "bottom up" narratives can illuminate aspects of issues often overlooked.
See generally Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2411 (1989) (examining the use of "stories" in the strug-
gle for racial reform); Man J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies
and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987). Matsuda writes:
What is suggested here is not abstract consideration of the position of the
least advantaged. The imagination of the academic philosopher cannot re-
create the experience of life on the bottom. Instead we must look to what
Gramsci called 'organic intellectuals,' grassroots philosophers who are
uniquely able to relate theory to the concrete experience of oppression. The
technique of imagining oneself black and poor in some hypothetical world is
less effective than studying the actual experience of black poverty and listen-
ing to those who have done so.
Id. at 325 (citations omitted).
123. Cole, supra note 92, at 648. In fact, minority communities may not character-
ize these problems as "environmental" at all. See Austin & Schill, supra note 5, at 71-
72. The relationship between minority groups and environmental organizations has
been less than ideal. See Reich, supra note 5, at 278.
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of environmental race discrimination, many disparities that result
from environmental decisions and policies can only be addressed
through political means. 24
Additionally, lawsuits can operate to disempower people of
color by relegating the resolution of a particular problem into fora
where the abundant resources of private corporations and govern-
mental entities carry the day, and where strategic decisions are
placed in the hands of legal and scientific "experts" rather than
members of the affected community. 125 Furthermore, by the time
a lawsuit is filed, it is often too late for the minority community to
participate in the political process in any meaningful way. Political
choices have already been made; bargains struck, Thus, when a
complaint is filed, positions become entrenched and battle lines are
drawn. Moreover, the framework of litigation often requires
claims to be made in a way that will not fundamentally alter the
underlying structure of decisionmaking. Thus, if a community is left
with litigation, it usually means that problem solving through medi-
ation, consultation, or full participation has either failed, or will be
delayed.
As has already been shown, people of color bear a dispropor-
tionate degree of environmental harm and risk. In order to rem-
edy this injustice, people of color have initially taken their cases to
the courts. While much can still be accomplished in the courtroom,
the doctrinal limitations of antidiscrimination laws and the highly
procedural and technical nature of most environmental laws and
regulations are formidable barriers to addressing the distributional
inequities of environmental burdens and benefits. 26 Moreover, liti-
gation may act to disempower minority communities by forcing
them to adopt the constraints of the courtroom. We must take a
holistic approach to addressing the dilemma of environmental in-
justice. We must begin to explore other avenues of redress.
IV. The Benefits of Administrative Reform: From Inside Out
If justice is to be achieved, one must consider not only the distri-
butional impacts that environmental remedies will have, but also
the decisionmaking process by which such impacts are allocated. 27
One avenue to environmental justice that has not been adequately
124. See Cole, supra note 92, at 641-60.
125. Id. at 650; Reich, supra note 5, at 281 n.47.
126. Of course, what it means to "achieve environmental justice" is itself a separate
inquiry. See generally Been, supra note 5.
127. See Torres, supra note 11.
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explored is the political avenue. This Section suggests that because
decisions which determine environmental law and policy are often
made at the administrative level128 (as regulatory decisions), fed-
eral, state, and local administrative processes offer unique and in-
valuable opportunities for assessing and addressing distributional
inequities. 129 In fact, only by changing the factors that are consid-
ered relevant in building the administrative record can the substan-
tive decisions ever be changed.
A. Environmental Decisions
There are three types of federal agencies that have the power to
make decisions which affect the distribution of environmental bur-
dens or benefits: (1) agencies that implement and administer envi-
ronmental laws; (2) agencies that conduct activities that directly
affect the environment; and (3) agencies that make decisions that
indirectly affect the environment. 3 ° State and local decisionmak-
ing entities may be divided into similar categories.
Although it is critical to consider how all of these agencies and
entities reach particular decisions, we can begin by examining the
decisionmaking processes of the first category of federal environ-
mental agencies, those that implement and administer environmen-
tal laws. The reason for this is plain: if environmental burdens
have been inequitably distributed then the best way to address that
problem is to do so directly.
B. Understanding Problem-Solving Within Divergent
Regulatory Cultures
The solutions for redistributing environmental burdens must, in
part, come from within the federal administrative framework.13 '
The impact of federal regulatory processes on state and local activi-
ties puts federal reform at the center of any proposed solution to
128. In many cases Congress has ducked hard political choices by leaving it up to
the agencies to promulgate regulations within broad congressionally established pa-
rameters. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in
Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 520-23 (1985).
129. Litigation and legislation are also important supplemental tools to administra-
tive change. However, political avenues offer immediate and essential solutions.
130. See SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 102 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al.
eds., 1993).
131. Although litigation also can be used to address distributional inequities, it
does not offer the sole avenue to justice. In fact, this Article argues that the resource-
intensive nature of litigation, the potential disempowerment, and the necessity of
technical expertise, suggest that litigation cannot be widely used to ensure environ-
mental justice.
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the problems of distributional inequity. The transformation of fed-
eral regulatory culture is at the heart of that reform. Because regu-
latory culture arises out of a set of shared perceptions and goals,
the preferred regulatory solutions are necessarily limited to the
conception of the problems as perceived by the actors within the
regulatory culture. 32 Thus, if EPA and other federal agencies are
to offer solutions to inequities in the distribution of environmental
burdens and in the laws by which those burdens are distributed,
they must make environmental justice part of their culture. 33 This
is not a mere additive process. Restructuring an extant regulatory
culture will be difficult initially, as is all change. Similarly, there
will be many efforts to translate the change into existing opera-
tional and analytic categories. Only by making the changes in vehi-
cles for expanding and solidifying the relationships between the
regulatory agent and its many constituencies can change have any
hope for success. This should not be understood as a recipe for
disguised co-optation or a variant on agency capture analysis. The
understanding that lies at the root of the motivation for change is
that the penalty for failure to change is bureaucratic irrelevance, if
only because the constituency is changing. These ideas are dis-
cussed more thoroughly in the next section.
C. Redefining Regulatory Cultures
1. Community Participation
The only way that regulatory culture can be redefined is by in-
cluding affected communities in the decisionmaking process.3
Only through such inclusion can the regulatory culture be instilled
with awareness and understanding of the true problems. In fact,
members of affected minority groups themselves are the most ap-
propriate ones to identify and prioritize the economic, social,
health, educational, and environmental issues for their communi-
ties. Historically, the racial and ethnic groups who bear the great-
est environmental burdens have not been participants in
132. See Gerald Torres, Theoretical Problems with the Environmental Regulation of
Agriculture, 8 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 193-94 (1989).
133. See Lazarus, supra note 5, at 850.
134. Several legal commentators and social scientists have noted the importance of
political and economic empowerment of minority and low-income communities. See
COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (1987); Bullard, supra note 6, at 45-78; Reich, supra
note 5, at 277-78; Lazarus, supra note 5; Cole, supra note 7.
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administrative environmental decisionmaking. 135 Now, with fairly
compelling evidence that these groups are disproportionately bur-
dened by environmental hazards, agencies must take special care
to see that minority group members within the agency who have
specific expertise are consulted in intra-agency decisionmaking,
and that those who live in the affected communities have access to
the decisionmaking process. 136 However, rather than presuming
minority communities have been "excluded" from environmental
decisionmaking and thereby focusing on recrimination, we should
accept that the process probably has not been as open as it should
be, and we should begin to concentrate on making the process
more accessible. Blame, in this context, is wasteful.
There are a number of procedural mechanisms which, if imple-
mented within administrative agencies, could improve the regula-
tory workings, begin to transform the governing regulatory culture,
and increase minority access to the decisionmaking process. In-
cluding those within agencies who have special expertise in the
construction of enforcement decisions or policy formulation has al-
ready been suggested. Notice and comment procedures should
also be more fully implemented to specifically include the views of
members of the communities that were formerly excluded from the
decisionmaking process. If that were accomplished, those living in
the affected communities would have greater access to the regula-
tory process. These results could also be achieved by holding pub-
lic hearings more frequently, expanding community outreach
programs, and developing alternative avenues for community input
with the assistance of newly formed host community advisory
committees. 37
Another way to force agencies to consider distributional inequi-
ties is to require formal agency consideration of the distributional
135. See Lazarus, supra note 5, at 822 & n.145 (citing Memorandum from Ed Han-
ley, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Administration, to Clarice Gaylord, Re: En-
vironmental Equity Report (Dec. 1991)).
136. EPA has begun already to ensure that minority and low-income communities
have access tothe agency's decisionmaking process. In May, Administrator Browner
met with environmental justice leaders to solicit their views on agency programs and
policies. EPA also recognized the importance of community outreach in recent testi-
mony before the House Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous Waste.
137. EPA is beginning to create Superfund Advisory Committees. Senator Specter
has introduced Senate Bill 443, which would amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act
(SWDA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA) to require that a host community advisory committee issue or
deny consent for each new permit application for a hazardous waste treatment stor-
age or disposal facility. S. 443, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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impacts of particular decisions. By using the mechanisms outlined
above, the agencies could construct ways to harness these new
sources of information to shape them into coherent recommenda-
tions for both assessing and distributing the burdens of our indus-
trial society in a more equitable fashion. Community impact
statements could be required for certain federal decisions just as
the NEPA requires environmental impact statements for major
federal actions significantly affecting the human environment. 138
Of course, if the NEPA model is used, and a procedural remedy is
adopted rather than a substantive remedy, there must be some as-
surance that communities have participated in the process. Addi-
tionally, there must be some assurance that decisionmakers have
sufficient information to fully assess the distributional impacts.
2. Capacity Building
Including affected communities in the decision-making process
and utilizing procedural remedies, however, may not be enough to
change regulatory cultures. Access is valuable only if those who
were formerly excluded are capable of translating that access into
thoughtful articulation of community concerns and meaningful sug-
gestions for change. Thoughtful suggestions can only be advanced
if the affected communities have the information necessary to en-
sure a full understanding of the problem. Thus, it is important to
provide communities with the technical assistance that will enable
them to know as much as possible, and as necessary, about the
complex regulatory provisions and processes that are intrinsic to
environmental law and policy. 139 In return for providing this assist-
ance, agencies will receive valuable information and comments
from affected communities.
Alternatively, capacity building can come from revised
processes. For example, New Jersey has created an Office of the
Public Advocate. Representatives from that Office have particular
rights and duties related to promoting the interests of the public.
A similar program may prove useful in the environmental arena. If
experts and specialists are available to community groups and are
required to advocate their interests, communities themselves will
be more likely to fully understand complex environmental issues
and thereby participate effectively.
138. See Lazarus, supra note 5, at 843.
139. EPA is considering offering expanded technical assistance grants to minority
and low-income communities.
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Administrative processes are not democratic by nature.140 Ac-
cess is only valuable to the extent that it forces agencies to consider
and address the concerns of minority communities, as expressed by
the people in those communities.' 4' Thus, even without a substan-
tive mandate to address the concerns of minorities, environmental
agencies and agencies that make decisions that affect the environ-
ment must adopt policies and make decisions that ensure an ac-
ceptable level of health protection for all communities, including
minority and low-income communities. They must change their
regulatory focus to allow for and require consideration of distribu-
tional effects. With that change, litigation may often be
unnecessary.
D. Pursuing Administrative Solutions First
If regulatory cultures are successfully changed to ensure better
consideration of, and accounting for, distributional inequities, ad-
ministrative processes can be a powerful tool for redressing and
preventing environmental inequities. One can see the intrinsic
value of pursuing administrative solutions by looking at antidis-
crimination cases and environmental regulation cases and asking,
"what could have eliminated the need for litigation in the first
instance?' '1
42
For example, in R.LS.E., Inc. v. Kay, 43 the King and Queen
County Board of Supervisors could have avoided the courtroom by
including minority populations in the decisionmaking process and
by evaluating its own siting patterns. If the Board had invited mi-
140. See Daniel P. Selmi, The Judicial Development of the California Environmental
Quality Act, 18 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 197, 252 (1984). Although notice and comment
procedures are intended to make agencies more democratic and responsive, and they
offer an important opportunity for affected persons to influence agency action, they
do not make policymakers at agencies accountable in the same way that elections do.
Nor should they, as there is some reason for preserving the Executive nature of ad-
ministrative agencies. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators
Should Make Political Decisions, 1 YALE J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
141. It is particularly important for agencies to address concerns of minorities as
expressed by minorities because they alone can provide insight into what is important
to the community, and what is a priority for the community.
142. The search for environmental justice can only be undertaken with an under-
standing of how, under civil rights and environmental laws, problems are identified
and characterized and of how solutions are framed. Clearly, neither civil rights laws
nor the environmental laws have prevented the disproportionate effect of environ-
mental protection laws and policies on minority and low-income communities in the
first instance. Now, as policymakers are faced with distributional inequities, one must
ask how we can correct and prevent inequities. This Article argues that this can only
be done through the use of both litigation and administrative reform.
143. 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), affd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).
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nority communities to the table, it would have had the opportunity
to explain its decision outside of the courtroom and without sub-
stantial cost. Likewise, the community would have had the oppor-
tunity to present its concerns. With communication, the parties
may have reached a compromise which would have addressed the
needs of the entire county, including minority populations.
Although the outcome may not have changed, if the County had
reached out to the community, it probably could have, at the very
least, prevented any claim of intentional discrimination. Addition-
ally, community citizens could have presented their unique per-
spective on the effects of siting a facility in their neighborhood in a
non-adversarial context.
Environmental regulation cases similarly show the inherent ben-
efits of administrative reform. Had the County in El Pueblo para
el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings,'" rather than taking a
narrow view of its legal responsibilities, appreciated and under-
stood that the affected community could and would contribute ef-
fectively to the administrative process, it would have published
public information in Spanish before being asked to do so. It was
the State's and County's failure to recognize the importance of
knowing the concerns of the community as expressed by the com-
munity, and their failure to solicit the views of the community, that
forced the residents of Kettleman City into the courtroom. Had
the State made clear, in the first instance, that translation was re-
quired, or had the County realized the importance of translation,
Kettleman City residents would have had the opportunity for
meaningful participation without going to court. 45 Thus, the
County, through its own lack of insight, fought and lost a battle it
never needed to fight. And, by fighting that battle, the County not
only needlessly expended valuable resources, but it alienated the
very constituency it was designed to serve-the people of Ket-
tleman City.
144. 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Dec. 30,
1991).
145. Some federal agencies have attempted to fully inform affected communities by
translating EIS for Spanish-speaking populations-for example, DOE in 1980 pub-
lished in Spanish an EIS summary for a proposed radioactive waste storage facility in
New Mexico (45 Fed. Reg. 70,539-41 (1980); HUD in 1980 prepared an EIS in Span-
ish for a housing project in Puerto Rico (45 Fed. Reg. 79,583-84 (1980) and 45 Fed.
Reg. 80,189 (1980)). Significantly, Exec. Order 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994) en-
courages federal agencies to translate environmental documents for limited-english
speakers.
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Even if the outcome would have been the same had the County
invited the community to participate, the people of Kettleman City
would have had the opportunity to present their needs directly to
the decisionmaker. The community, at the very least, would have
raised awareness of social, economic, 46 and other concerns. But,
perhaps with new awareness of these concerns the decisionmakers
in Kettleman City would have begun to understand and consider
both the distributional effects and potential cumulative effects of
its decisions.
We can also learn from another case that was recently decided
by the district court of New Mexico. In City of Albuquerque v.
Browner,47 an Indian pueblo, located in New Mexico, set water
quality standards for the Rio Grande river that were more strin-
gent than the State's standards. EPA approved those standards.
The City, the only upstream discharger, filed suit challenging
EPA's approval of the standards and the issuance of a permit for
the City's waste water treatment plant which included the pueblo's
standards. 148
We have long recognized the sovereignty of Indian Nations as a
matter of law. But, it was only recently that we began to change
our environmental laws to grant Indian tribes the same sovereign
rights that states have under environmental law. As the first
pueblo tried to invoke those rights under the Clean Water Act, the
United States faced a lawsuit.149 The District Court for the District
of New Mexico concluded that EPA did not act arbitrarily in ap-
proving and enforcing the pueblo's standards. 150
The case presents two important lessons. First, federal, state,
and local governments should be cognizant of all communities and,
when making decisions, should meet the needs of the community,
as expressed by the community. In Browner, the pueblo demon-
146. Often, the economic concerns of a community at large lead that community to
make decisions without fully assessing the range of environmental and health effects.
Decisionmakers must begin to prevent communities from being in a position where
they are forced to choose between jobs and the environment. That can be done, in
part, by recognizing that underemployment and unemployment are themselves health
risks which should be taken into account by decisionmakers. In fact, the poor and
people of color have higher death rates than the wealthy. See Gregory Pappas, The
Increasing Disparity in Mortality Between Socioeconomic Groups in the United States,
1960 and 1986, NEw ENG. J. MED., July 8, 1993, at 103, 104; Mike Snider, Education,
Wealth Lower Death Risk Across the Board, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 1993, at 6D.
147. No. 93-82-MCiv (D. N.M. Oct. 25, 1993).
148. Id. at 3.
149. Id. at 2.
150. Id.
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strated concerns about the quality of the water in the Rio Grande.
That concern arose because members of the pueblo use the water
to fish and for other cultural purposes. 151 Perhaps, in this case,
with greater understanding and appreciation of these uses, New
Mexico would have adopted more stringent standards or EPA
would have required more stringent standards in the first instance.
The second lesson we can learn from Browner is that sovereigns
should be sovereign. It took us a long time to grant Indian tribes
rights under environmental laws. Now those rights should be
respected.
Although it is clear that litigation could have been avoided in
many of the "environmental justice cases" to date if administrative
cultures had been more open and aware of the relevant issues, it
also is important to recognize that litigation can serve an important
purpose. If the decisionmaker properly considers and weighs the
distributional effects of particular decisions, traditional environ-
mental and civil rights litigation can be used to address instances
where impermissible environmental hazards exist or where racial
animus is present. Thus, litigation can serve as a "check" on ad-
ministrative action.
V. Conclusion
Our current level of knowledge requires that we begin develop-
ing a framework for addressing the distributional issues associated
with race and environmental hazards. The construction of that
framework ought to be done from within the extant regulatory cul-
ture because that is the best way to ensure that institutional change
will be achieved and made permanent. Only by transforming the
ways that the problems of environmental justice are both con-
ceived and perceived, can we create the institutional change that
distributes costs and responsibilities without focusing on questions
of fault or guilt. What we want are results-not self-righteousness.
The effort must be to accomplish the goal of environmental protec-
tion in the most equitable and efficient manner possible. All gov-
ernmental agencies and departments must begin to work together
with affected communities to develop policies and programs that
ensure that minorities, and the public as a whole, benefit from a
clean environment and achieve a basic level of public health pro-
tection. Focusing on the ultimate public health costs of a mal-dis-
151. Many communities, not just Native American communities, rely on fish for
subsistence. It is important for states with such populations to consider the needs of
all of these communities when setting water quality standards and other standards.
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tribution of environmental burdens reveals what is at stake in
ensuring fuller participation in environmental decisionmaking.
Real solutions can only come from open, intensive, deliberative,
and well-informed communication. 152 Policies and programs must
be developed with an understanding of, and appreciation for, the
needs of communities (environmental, social, economic, and
health), as expressed by those communities. Those needs must be
addressed with a recognition of the natural barriers to the satisfac-
tion of each. The dialogue has begun. However, we must make
every effort to assure that it does not die as it did years ago only to
resurface in twenty years as a problem that never went away.153
152. There is a tradition best represented by Frank Michelman that makes this
point most forcefully. See Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1986).
153. The problem of environmental justice was raised at a conference co-sponsored
by the Sierra Club and the Urban League in Detroit in 1978. In the Urban Environ-
ment Conference these groups along with others like Environmentalists for Full Em-
ployment tried to join environmentalists with other social justice activists. Despite
these efforts to begin a dialogue on environmental justice, that coalition was solidified
only recently.
